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This study explores the extent to which changes in age-at-marriage laws are effective in curbing early 
marriage and, if so, whether delays in age at marriage brought about by legal changes increase women’s 
likelihood to participate in higher education. To answer these questions, we combine individual-level data 
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outcomes. Our results suggest that these laws work only selectively – specifically, significant reductions 
in early marriage following the law implementation are observed only in two out of the six countries – yet 
when they work, their impact on early marriage has important implications for women’s higher-education 
attendance. In Tajikistan and Nepal, an increase in the legal age at marriage by one or two years, 
respectively, leads to a 20-60 percentage-point higher likelihood of attending some form of higher 
education. In light of the significant human capital gains documented in countries where laws proved to 
have an impact, we conclude by arguing that, in order for changes in laws to be effective, better laws must 
be accompanied by better enforcement and monitoring to delay marriage and protect the rights of women 
and girls. Adequate policy implementation and enforcement are necessary preconditions for actual 
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Abstract 
This study explores the extent to which changes in age-at-marriage laws are effective in 
curbing early marriage and, if so, whether delays in age at marriage brought about by legal changes 
increase women’s likelihood to participate in higher education. To answer these questions, we 
combine individual-level data from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and Multiple 
Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) with longitudinal information on policy changes from the 
PROSPERED project for six low- and middle-income countries from three broad regions: Benin 
and Mauritania (Sub-Sharan Africa), Tajikistan and Kazakhstan (Central Asia), and Nepal and 
Bhutan (South Asia). We adopted regression discontinuity design to obtain estimates of the causal 
effect of changes in age-at-marriage laws on early marriage and educational outcomes. Our results 
suggest that these laws work only selectively – specifically, significant reductions in early marriage 
following the law implementation are observed only in two out of the six countries – yet when 
they work, their impact on early marriage has important implications for women’s higher-
education attendance. In Tajikistan and Nepal, an increase in the legal age at marriage by one or 
two years, respectively, leads to a 20-60 percentage-point higher likelihood of attending some form 
of higher education. In light of the significant human capital gains documented in countries where 
laws proved to have an impact, we conclude by arguing that, in order for changes in laws to be 
effective, better laws must be accompanied by better enforcement and monitoring to delay 
marriage and protect the rights of women and girls. Adequate policy implementation and 
enforcement are necessary preconditions for actual change and should be the subject of greater 
international attention and investments. 
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Introduction 
Early marriage – defined as the marriage of children below 18 – is widely recognized in international 
human rights agreements as a harmful and discriminatory global practice. International governmental, 
academic, and advocacy stakeholders have called for countries to establish legislative frameworks that 
prohibit early marriage and close legal loopholes that permit marriage below the age of 18 (Human 
Rights Watch 2011, 2013; Jensen and Thornton 2003; Walker 2012). The disproportionately high rate 
of early marriage among girls compared to boys is also widely documented and recognized by the 
international scholarship and community as reflecting persistent gender inequalities (Pesando and 
Abufhele 2019; UNICEF 2014) and slow economic development (Vogelstein 2013).  
Although not the direct target of a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) per se, reducing early 
marriage is critical to achieving the majority of the SDGs set by the United Nations (UN). For instance, 
early marriage disproportionately affects rural and disadvantaged girls in low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs) creating cycles of poverty that perpetuate inequalities (Dahl 2010; Otoo-Oyortey 
and Pobi 2003). Early marriage also keeps girls in poverty by depriving them of opportunities such as 
education and access to paid employment (Delprato et al. 2015; Field and Ambrus 2008; Sunder 2019). 
Women marrying in teenage years or younger have little say in terms of when they marry and whom 
they marry (Jensen and Thornton 2003) and have low post-marital agency within unions (Crandall et 
al. 2016; Yount, Crandall, and Cheong 2018), often resulting in frequent instances of domestic violence 
(Hindin and Fatusi 2009; Nasrullah, Zakar, and Zakar 2014; Rahman et al. 2014). Teen brides may 
also be unable to negotiate access to safe sex and medical care, leaving themselves vulnerable to health 
risks such as sexually transmitted infections and early pregnancies (Godha, Hotchkiss, and Gage 2013; 
Nour 2006), which in turn correlate with worse pregnancy outcomes for mothers (Ashcraft and Lang 
2006; Fraser, Brockert, and Ward 1995; Ganchimeg et al. 2014; Raj 2010) and worse health outcomes 
for children (Efevbera et al. 2017). 
In light of the sustained prevalence of early marriage and the array of negative consequences 
ensuing from it, there is heated discussion on the effectiveness of policies aimed at curbing the 
practice. Changes in age-at-marriage laws have featured prominently among the measures adopted by 
governments. Arthur et al. (2018) documented improvements in the frequency of countries to adopt 
legal provisions that prohibit marriage below the age of 18, and some research provides evidence of a 
significant association between protective laws and lower rates of early marriage (Bharadwaj 2015; 
Maswikwa et al. 2015), as well as declines in adolescent fertility rates (Kim et al. 2013). Conversely, 
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looking at a sample of 60 countries, Collin and Talbot (2018) found that – despite increases in legal 
provisions – most countries are not enforcing the proposed laws, and enforcement is not getting better 
over time. These results suggest that renewed efforts to outlaw early marriage may not deter the 
practice, even where the incidence of early marriage is declining – a finding that is largely echoed in 
Kidman and Heymann (2016). In a similar spirit, Arthur et al. (2018) documented persistent 
widespread discriminatory provisions in legislation that disadvantage girls, alongside legal exceptions 
to minimum age provisions based on parental consent and customary/religious laws that create 
loopholes that lower the legal minimum age at marriage below the age of 18. A systematic review on 
legal interventions to curb early marriage found positive results in terms of decreasing the proportion 
married or increasing age at marriage in six cases, positive and negative findings in one case, and no 
statistical impacts on the proportion married or age at marriage in four other instances (Kalamar, Lee-
Rife, and Hindin 2016). As such, the understanding of the proper functioning of these laws across 
diverse contexts remains inadequate.  
Despite the complexities of identifying effective policies to prevent or reduce early marriage, 
this remains a key priority for scholars and policymakers concerned with raising children and women’s 
status by boosting their human-capital opportunities. There’s in fact a rich literature relating later age 
at marriage with positive educational outcomes in LMICs. For instance, using instrumental variable 
(IV) techniques to account for the potential endogeneity of early marriage, Delprato et al. (2015) found 
a delay in early marriage by one year to be associated with an increase of half a year of education in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and nearly one third of a year in South-West Asia, as well as a lower likelihood of 
dropping out from secondary school of 5.5 percent in the latter region. Similarly, Field and Ambrus 
(2008) found each additional year that marriage was delayed in Bangladesh to be associated with 0.22 
additional years of schooling and 5.6 percent higher literacy. Polyakova (2018) found that delaying 
marriage by a year in Nigeria was associated with an 8.9 percentage-point increase in the probability 
of obtaining some secondary education, and with a 10–11 percentage-point increase in the likelihood 
of completing secondary school. Lastly, a recent study from Uganda suggests that a one-year delay in 
marriage for women led to higher educational attainment (0.5–0.75 years), literacy (10 percentage 
points) and, ultimately, labor force participation rates (Sunder 2019).  
Although perhaps implicit in some of the above findings, none of the above studies focuses 
specifically on higher education or university-related outcomes. This is surprising, as higher education 
is currently at the core of the post-2015 SDG agenda (target 4.3), which aims to ensure that by 2030 
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all women and men have “equal access to affordable quality technical, vocational and tertiary 
education, including university” (Ilie and Rose 2016; United Nations 2015). Although gender gaps in 
education at the primary and secondary school levels have considerably narrowed or even reversed 
(Grant and Behrman 2010; Psaki, McCarthy, and Mensch 2018), gender equality in education cannot 
be achieved so long as women are underrepresented in participation in higher education, which 
remains the case in many LMICs (Ilie and Rose 2016; Myers and Griffin 2019). This renewed emphasis 
on higher education is linked, among other reasons, to recent attention to its benefits for individuals’ 
life-course trajectories and for societies, in ways that are argued to contribute to economic 
development, poverty reduction, and societal wellbeing (Bloom et al. 2014). Relatedly, the focus on 
gender gaps in higher education also calls for a better understanding of the drivers or root causes of 
these imbalances, together with the policy levers that might be adopted to tackle the issue.   
Low levels of higher-education attendance among women in LMICs could be related to gender 
inequalities in access to higher education, alongside cultural factors influencing perceptions about the 
role of women within households and society. In many settings, women are expected to marry and 
have children early, thus limiting their opportunities to complete secondary school and/or achieve 
higher educational levels (Jensen and Thornton 2003). The lack of recognition of social status of 
women other than a wife and mother might imply that the expectation to formally participate in the 
labor market in such contexts might be low, deeming participation in higher education not a priority 
(Parsons et al. 2015). In light of the evidence reviewed thus far, there is ample reason to expect a delay 
in marriage age to increase women’s chances to attend some form of higher education (McCleary-Sills 
et al. 2015; Otoo-Oyortey and Pobi 2003). 
This study thus provides two contributions. First, we explore the extent to which changes in 
age-at-marriage laws are effective in curbing early marriage across six LMICs, namely Benin, Bhutan, 
Kazakhstan, Mauritania, Nepal, and Tajikistan. Second, in those contexts where laws prove to be 
effective, we further investigate whether delays in age at marriage brought about by legal changes 
might boost women’s likelihood to participate in higher education. We do so by combining individual-
level data from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys 
(MICS) with longitudinal information on policy changes from the PROSPERED Child Marriage 
Database. Our findings are twofold. On the negative side, we find significant reductions in early 
marriage following policy changes only in two out of the six countries considered, namely Nepal and 
Tajikistan. On the positive side, our results suggest that in countries where changes in age-at-marriage 
5 
 
laws are effective, women are significantly more likely to attend some form of higher education. In 
Tajikistan and Nepal, an increase in the legal age at marriage by one and two years, respectively, leads 
to a 20-60 percentage-point higher likelihood of attending higher education. 
Taken together, our findings shed additional light on the mixed and highly context-specific 
effectiveness of policies aimed at curbing early marriage and suggest that, in order to be fully effective, 
changes in laws must be accompanied by close enforcement and monitoring to delay marriage and 
protect the rights of women and girls.  
 
Data 
We focus on six countries that passed a law increasing the legal minimum age at marriage since 1995 
and that have a DHS or MICS conducted after the law implementation (refer to Table 1). We used 
the Policy-Relevant Observational Studies for Population Health Equity and Responsible 
Development (PROSPERED) database to identify these countries as well as years in which the 
respective laws were passed (Nandi, Vincent, and Atabay 2018). Subsequently, searching through other 
sources such as, for example, official governmental documents, we identified the month of the law 
implementation in each country. 
 
Table 1: Details of the minimum age-at-marriage laws, datasets, country characteristics, all countries 
 
Country Survey 
Date of Law 
Implementation 
Minimum Age at 
Marriage % In 
Union 
Before 
Age 18 
% 
Entered 
Higher 
Educatio
n 
Typical 
Age of 
Secondary 
School  
Completion 
After 
New 
Law 
Before 
 New 
 Law 
Tajikistan DHS 2017 07/2011 18 17 12,3 19,1 18 
Nepal DHS 2016 09/2002 18 16 49,1 15,4 18 
Kazakhstan MISC 2015 12/1998 18 17 7,8 40,0 18 
Bhutan MISC 2010 07/1996 18 16 30,6 3,2 19 
Benin DHS 2017 08/2004 18 15 35,5 2,4 19 
Mauritania MISC 2015 07/2001 18 at puberty (14) 35,2 3,9 18 
Notes: For Nepal: age at marriage with parental consent; for the rest of the countries: age at marriage in general. The survey 
data do not permit to fully distinguish between marriage and cohabitation as they refer to unions in general. We use 14 as 
the age of puberty in Mauritania. The average age at menarche, which is a culmination of a process of puberty, tends to be 
between ages 13 and 15, depending on a country (Thomas et al. 2001). Since we could not identify the average age at 
menarche for Mauritania, we use age 14 as an approximation. Percentages (%) are weighted estimates calculated from each 
survey for women aged 20-49. Typical age of secondary school completion is calculated based on the information about 
the typical age of entrance into secondary school and the theoretical duration of secondary school from UNESCO 
(http://data.uis.unesco.org/).  
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In the process of the selection of countries, we excluded those: (i) that had surveys conducted 
only among ever-married women, (ii) for which we were unable to identify the exact date (year and 
month) of the law, and (iii) that had a survey conducted shortly after the law implementation and thus 
provided insufficient information about women who were affected by it. Our final sample consists of 
six countries from three broad regions: Benin and Mauritania (Sub-Sharan Africa), Tajikistan and 
Kazakhstan (Central Asia), and Nepal and Bhutan (South Asia). The minimum age at marriage prior 
to the law implementation differed between the countries. Following the law, women in all countries 
are legally allowed to marry no earlier than at the age of 18.  
Both DHS and MICS are nationally representative surveys of women of reproductive age (15-
49) and have similar designs, which facilitates the cross-national analysis. These surveys provide 
information about women’s date of birth (month and year), age at first union, and level of education. 
We define early marriage as a first union that took place before the age of 18. Using information about 
educational attendance, we identify women who entered some form of higher (post-secondary, or 
tertiary, or university-level) education. In MICSs for Kazakhstan and Mauritania and in DHSs, the 
post-secondary level of education is called “higher”; in MICS for Bhutan it is called 
“college/university.” The six countries covered by our analysis represent settings with diverse levels 
of early marriage and higher-education attendance, as presented in Table 1. The percentage of women 
who entered first union before the age of 18 ranged from around 8 in Kazakhstan to as high as 49 in 
Nepal, according to the listed surveys. While only 2% of women entered some form of higher 
education in Benin, 40% of women attended higher education in Kazakhstan.  
Beyond casting light on the relationship between early marriage and higher-education 
attendance, our focus on post-secondary education has an important advantage. Since we classify early 
union as a first union before the age of 18 and women typically enter higher education at the age of 
18 or later in all countries (refer to Table 1, typical age of secondary school completion), we minimize 
the risk that our results are influenced by reverse causality. Our research design ensures the correct 
temporal sequencing of the treatment and the outcome, the violation of which is a common concern 
in studies of the relationship between union formation and education (secondary education, in 
particular).  
We focus on women who were at least 20 years old at the time of a survey in each country to 
make sure that all women included in our analysis passed the typical age of entrance into higher 
education (refer to Table 1, typical age of secondary school completion) 
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Methods 
To assess the effectiveness of the laws, we examine whether increases in the minimum age at marriage 
to 18 reduced the prevalence of early marriage and, subsequently, whether this change affected 
women’s higher-education attendance. For this purpose, we use a regression discontinuity design 
(RDD). In the context of our study, this quasi-experimental method is based on the idea that women 
who were aged just below and just above the minimum age-at-marriage at the time of the law 
implementation are comparable on both observed and unobserved characteristics, and differ only in 
terms of their exposure to the law. Relying on the assumption that women’s exposure to the change 
in the law is exogenous, we aim to capture the causal effect of early marriage on the likelihood of 
attending higher education. The main advantage of this empirical strategy is that it accounts for both 
observed and unobserved characteristics that might affect whether women marry early and whether 
they enter higher education (endogeneity issue).  
The first step of RDD involves establishing whether the minimum age-at-marriage laws 
reduced early marriage, i.e., whether there is a discontinuity in the probability of early marriage at the 
cut-off that distinguishes women who were exposed to the law from those who were not. Since the 
probability of early marriage is unlikely to fall to zero among women who were subject to the new law 
(i.e., it is likely that not all women will comply with the law and some will still marry before the age of 
18), we employ a fuzzy RDD specification.  
Fuzzy RDD is equivalent to an instrumental variable approach and can be implemented with 
the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression (Angrist and Pischke 2009). In our case, the outcome 
variable is a binary indicator of higher education attendance and the treatment is a binary variable 
describing whether a woman married before the age of 18. The treatment is instrumented using a 
binary indicator of exposure to the minimum age-at-marriage law among women who were at least 20 
years old at the time of the survey. The exposure indicator is described in the detail in the following 
sections. In the first stage, we regress the treatment indicator D on the instrument Z (Eq.1). In the 
second stage, we regress the outcome Y on the predicted value of the treatment D from the first stage. 
The estimate of interest is the local average treatment effect that can be interpreted as a causal effect 
for the subgroup that complies with the instrument (i.e. the new minimum age-at-marriage law). 
𝐷𝑖 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1 𝑍𝑖 +  𝛼2𝑋 + 𝜐𝑖                                           (Eq.1) 
𝑌𝑖 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 ?̂?𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑋 + 𝜀𝑖                                            (Eq.2) 
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We conduct and report the results of 2SLS, but our main analyses are based on bivariate probit 
models for two reasons. First, our endogenous variable (early marriage) as well as the outcome variable 
(higher educational attendance) are binary. Moreover, higher-education attendance in some countries 
covered by our analyses is relatively low (refer to Table 1). Since the probability of entering higher 
education is close to zero in some countries, the modelling approach that constrains the outcome 
variable to the plausible range of 0 to 1 might be more adequate than a linear model that can produce 
results beyond these bounds.  
Bivariate probit model involves a simultaneous estimation of the probability of early marriage 
and higher education attendance. Instead of regressing the outcome Y on the predicted values of the 
treatment D, as in the second stage equation, it is implemented as a system of two equations that are 
modelled jointly. Similarly, as in the first stage of the 2SLS, in the first equation, we regress the binary 
early marriage indicator on a binary indicator describing women’s exposure to the minimum age-at-
marriage law. In the second equation, we regress a binary indicator describing women’s education 
attendance on a binary early marriage indicator. In such a defined bivariate probit model, the 
correlation between the error terms of the first and the second equation (rho) allows testing for 
endogeneity of early marriage and higher education attendance.  
Apart from the results of the 2SLS and bivariate probit models, we also present results from 
an OLS (linear probability models) and probit models that do not account for the endogeneity of early 
marriage. For the linear probability models, we report coefficients; for the probit models, we report 
marginal effects. In all of the models for Nepal and Benin, we control for women’s religion (X in Eq.1 
and Eq.2). These are the only two countries where the religion variable is available. We are unable to 
control for other pre-treatment characteristics in any of the countries, such as for example wealth or 
place of residence, because this information in DHS and MICS refers to that at the time of the survey. 
Using information about the month and year of women’s birth and policies’ implementation, 
we group women into those whose ability to marry before the age of 18 was changed by the policy 
implementation (“treated”, henceforth) and those who were not affected by the policy (“control”, 
henceforth). We create a binary indicator which takes a values of 1 for women who were affected by 
the new law, and 0 for women who were not affected (Z in Eq.1). For instance, in Tajikistan the 
minimum age at marriage was raised by 1 year (from 17 to 18) in July 2011 (refer to Table 1). We 
classify women as treated if they were younger than exactly 17 years old at the moment of the policy, 
i.e., if they were still 16 in July 2011. These women were only exposed to the legal age at marriage of 
9 
 
18. We classify women as control if they were more than exactly 17 years old at the moment of the 
policy, i.e., women who were at least 17 years and 1 month old in July 2011. These women had an 
opportunity to legally marry before the age of 18. We exclude women who turned exactly 17 in July 
2011, since we cannot determine whether that happened before or after the policy was implemented. 
We define the treated and control groups in a similar manner for the rest of the countries.  
RDD requires choosing a width of the interval (bandwidth) that specifies which women 
around the cut-off defining the treated and control groups are included in the analysis. This bandwidth 
needs to be sufficiently large to ensure adequate sample size yet sufficiently small to ensure that control 
and treatment groups are comparable. For our main analyses, we present a 3-year (i.e., 36-month) 
bandwidth, but we conduct sensitivity analyses with 2- and 4-year bandwidths (i.e., 24- and 48-month 
bandwidths). We provide descriptive statistics for the control and the treatment groups as defined for 
the purpose of our main analyses in Table 2. Preliminary statistics already suggest that early marriage 
was lower among the treated, while higher-education attendance was higher.  
 
 
Table 2: Details of the treated and control groups, all countries 
 
Country 
Age at Law 
Implementation 
N 
% in Union Before 
Age 18 
% Entered Higher 
Education 
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control 
Tajikistan 13-16 17-20 1,233 1,146 8,5 12,9 23,4 18,4 
Nepal 12-15 16-19 1,241 1,128 45,1 53,1 22,0 13,0 
Kazakhstan 13-16 17-20 1,206 1,142 6,7 10,7 49,8 39,0 
Bhutan 12-15 16-19 1,468 1,462 29,7 32,9 4,8 3,6 
Benin 11-14 15-18 1,902 1,627 36,6 38,7 3,0 2,8 
Mauritania 10-13 14-17 1,573 1,398 37,9 35,7 3,9 3,7 
 
Notes: Percentages (%) are weighted estimates. N: number of observations. Treated and control groups defined using the 
3-year (36-month) bandwidth, which is the main specification used for the purpose of the analyses reported in Table 3 and 
4. 
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Results  
Effectiveness of changes in age-at-marriage laws 
Figure 1 provides a graphical depiction of the fuzzy RDD specification described above, aimed at 
evaluating whether changes in age-at-marriage laws effectively reduced early marriage. Each graph 
reports the share of women – aged 20 and above at the time of the survey – who entered first union 
before the age of 18 in each country, as a function of the age at law implementation. The dotted lines 
correspond to the treatment group, i.e., those girls whose ability to marry was changed by the law, 
while the solid lines correspond to the control group, i.e., those girls who were unaffected by the law 
implementation. Figure 1 provides evidence of a clear discontinuity only in Tajikistan and Nepal, while 
the remaining panels do not provide sufficient evidence – and consistent-enough patterns – to 
conclude that the laws were effective in reducing early marriage.  
These findings are confirmed by coefficient estimates reported in Table 3. These are bivariate 
associations predicting the probability of a girl entering a union before age 18 (dummy=1 if entered a 
union before age 18) as a function of treatment (dummy=1 if exposed to the new law). We report 
coefficients from both a linear probability model (LPM) and marginal effects from a probit 
specification. While the sign is consistently negative in all countries except for Mauritania, the 
estimates are only statistically significant in Tajikistan and Nepal. In these two countries, being exposed 
to the law reduced the likelihood of entering marriage before age 18 by 5 and 8 percentage points, 
respectively. Note that these estimates also serve as the first stage in an IV 2SLS approach, hence the 
F-test reported alongside the statistically significant coefficient estimates for Tajikistan and Nepal – 
above the conventional threshold of 10, especially in Nepal. Robustness checks with a wider and a 
narrower bandwidth are presented in Supplementary Materials Table S.1. The only difference between 
the three specifications is that the use of a 4-year bandwidth produces a significant decrease in the 
probability of early marriage in Kazakhstan and Bhutan as well. Nonetheless, the sensitivity of the 
results to the choice of the bandwidth (statistically insignificant change in case of 3- and 2-year 
bandwidths) and the lack of visible discontinuities for Kazakhstan and Bhutan in Figure 1 provide us 
with insufficient evidence to be able to claim that the laws reduced the probability of early marriage 
in these two countries. 
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Figure 1: Proportion (Prop.) of women who entered first union before the age of 18 by the age at the law implementation and their 
exposure to the law, women who were at least 20 years old at the time of the survey, weighted percentages, all countries
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Table 3: Results of the OLS models (coefficients), F-statistics for statistically significant associations 
and probit models (marginal effects). Outcome: 1 – first union before age 18 (early union), 0- no first 
union before age 18 (reference category). Independent variable: 1 – treated, 0 – control (reference 
category), all countries 
 
  LPM (Coefs) F statistic Probit (MEs) 
  Early union   Early union 
Tajikistan -0.045** 10.95 -0.045** 
 (0.014)  (0.014) 
Nepal -0.083*** 17.30 -0.083*** 
 (0.020)  (0.020) 
Kazakhstan -0.021 - -0.021 
 (0.012)  (0.012) 
Bhutan -0.029 - -0.029 
 (0.017)  (0.017) 
Benin -0.015 - -0.015 
 (0.016)  (0.016) 
Mauritania 0.016 - 0.016 
  (0.017)   (0.017) 
 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05 
Notes: Coefs: Coefficients; MEs: marginal effects. Control for religion in Nepal and Benin only, as these are the only 
countries where the variable is available. MEs for Nepal and Benin are calculated as average marginal effects. Results 
without controls for religion are essentially unchanged and available upon request.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at the enumeration area level. P-values for Kazakhstan and Bhutan are p~0.08, hence we 
report it here as not statistically significant. The main reason is that we need a strong instrument to evaluate the impacts 
on higher-education attendance.  
 
 
Implications for higher-education attendance  
Table 4 provides results on whether changes in age-at-marriage laws increased women’s likelihood to 
attend higher education in those countries in which the laws proved effective in curbing early marriage, 
namely Tajikistan and Nepal. We answer this question by means of a bivariate probit specification 
accounting for the plausible endogeneity of early marriage and provide complementary estimates from 
a simple probit neglecting the endogeneity issue. For these specifications, we report marginal effects. 
The second stage of the 2SLS approach obtained by a simple LPM is reported in Supplementary 
Materials Table S.2. Despite the level of consistency across the two estimation strategies – both 
suggesting that endogeneity is an issue of concern that ought to be taken into account – we take 
estimates from the bivariate probit as our preferred one. As expected, the LPM delivers predicted 
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values that are outside of the plausible range, due to relatively low shares of women attending higher 
education (around 0.20 or less).  
Our results provide evidence of a negative and statistically significant effect of entering early 
marriage on the probability of attending higher education. A simple probit model suggests that early 
marriage decreases the probability of attending higher education by 22 and 24 percentage points in 
Tajikistan and Nepal, respectively. Taking the endogeneity of early marriage into account by 
considering the role of changes in the laws, these effects are further magnified, as early marriage is 
associated with a lower probability of attending higher education by 35 and 59 percentage points. The 
results of the robustness checks with a wider and narrower bandwidth are very similar (refer to 
Supplementary Materials Tables S.3 and S.4).  
 
Table 4: Results of bivariate probit models (marginal effects), Nepal and Tajikistan 
 
  Bivariate Probit (MEs) Probit (MEs) 
  Early Union Higher Education Higher Education 
Tajikistan 
Treated (ref.: control) -0.048*** - - 
 (0.012)   
Early union (ref.: no early union) - -0.352*** -0.225*** 
  (0.014) (0.019) 
 biprobit rho=0.985***  
 
    
Nepal 
Treated (ref.: control) -0.097*** - - 
 (0.017)   
Early union (ref.: no early union) - -0.587*** -0.244*** 
  (0.044) (0.018) 
 biprobit rho=0.865***  
 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05 
Notes: ME: marginal effects; Ref: reference category. Control for religion included in Nepal (variable not available in 
Tajikistan). MEs for Nepal are calculated as average marginal effects. Results without control for religion are essentially 
unchanged and available upon request. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the 
enumeration area level. The last column reports marginal effects from a simple probit specification which does not take 
into account the potential endogeneity of early marriage (for reference purposes only). Results from a simple 2SLS model 
– rather than bivariate probit – are reported in Supplementary Materials Table S.2. Results are fully consistent, yet predicted 
values are outside of plausible boundaries due to shares of women who enter higher education below or around 0.20. 
 
 
14 
 
We acknowledge that this is a big effect size, yet these coefficients need to be contextualized 
by taking some possible factors into account. First, the higher magnitude of the bivariate probit 
coefficients might suggest a downward bias deriving from either unobservable and omitted variables 
or measurement error in reporting age at marriage or marriage status (“attenuation bias”), which is far 
from infrequent in sample surveys (Dahl 2010). Second, and partly related to the above, the high 
magnitudes may shed concerns on the validity of the instrument. While there is no a priori theoretical 
argument to believe that changes in marriage laws are an invalid instrument for early marriage, this 
cannot be tested with the data at hand, hence the claim cannot be ruled out. Third, and perhaps most 
likely, it is important to note that the fuzzy RDD allows us to estimate merely the local average 
treatment effect on compliers, a special case of the local average treatment effect. This means that our 
results should be interpreted as the causal effect for the subgroup of individuals that comply with the 
instrument, for whom the returns to later marriage might be larger than average.   
 
Conclusions 
This study has explored the extent to which changes in age-at-marriage laws are effective in curbing 
early marriage and, if so, whether delays in age at marriage brought about by legal changes increase 
women’s likelihood to participate in higher education – an oft-neglected scholarly outcome, yet one 
that is central to the post-2015 SDG agenda and is now at the forefront of important discussions 
within the international community. We tackled our two research questions using survey data from 
six LMICs located in different regions of the world combined with longitudinal information on policy 
changes. We adopted simple causal inference techniques to obtain estimates of the causal effect of 
changes in age-at-marriage laws on early marriage and educational outcomes. In so doing, we reached 
two different sets of findings. The first set of results is rather worrisome and calls for governments 
and policymakers’ attention to make policy implementation more uniformly effective. The second set 
of findings is encouraging and suggests that effective policy implementation – i.e., legal provisions 
accompanied by adequate enforcement and monitoring – may importantly and positively shape 
women’s life-course trajectories, hence contributing to raising women’s status within society. 
Specifically, we found significant reductions in early marriage following the policy changes only in two 
out of the six countries considered, namely Nepal and Tajikistan. Yet in these countries where the 
changes in age-at-marriage laws were effective, women were significantly more likely to attend some 
form of higher education. In Tajikistan and Nepal, an increase in the legal age at marriage by, 
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respectively, one and two years, led to a 20-60 percentage-point higher likelihood of attending higher 
education. 
Our first finding relating to the mixed and context-specific effectiveness of policy changes 
aimed at curbing early marriage aligns with claims made by Arthur et al. (2018) and Collin and Talbot 
(2018) that, despite the increasing prevalence of legal provisions aimed at increasing the legal age at 
marriage, the level of enforcement varies widely, and legal exceptions based on parental consent and 
customary or religious laws remain in place – alongside high rates of illegal marriages (Collin and 
Talbot 2018) – thus preventing the full effectiveness of the legal provisions. Unfortunately, we did not 
have data on exact implementation procedures, monitoring, or enforcement, but several sources 
suggest that these are serious issues (Bharadwaj 2015; Kidman and Heymann 2016).  
Our second finding relating to the implications of changes in laws for higher education is 
instead novel in the literature, thus adding to scholarly research on the implications of early marriage 
for educational outcomes, typically measured earlier in life (Field and Ambrus 2008; Delprato et al. 
2015; Polyakova 2018; Sunder 2019, among others). Also, this literature tends to be focused on sub-
Saharan Africa, India, and Bangladesh, thus making our results for Nepal and Tajikistan informative 
and stressing an additional layer of novelty from a purely “geographical” standpoint. As discussed 
above, we acknowledge that our estimated coefficients taking into account the endogenous nature of 
early marriage are quite sizeable in both relative and absolute sense. While it is hard to evaluate these 
effect sizes in light of the relevant literature on the topic – as we are not aware of any study focusing 
on higher education as an outcome – we can nonetheless relate our findings to those of similar studies 
using changes in marriage laws as instrumental variables. For instance, using an IV approach, Dahl 
(2010) found that a woman who marries young in the US is 31 percentage points more likely to live 
in poverty when she is older, an estimate that is more than double its simple OLS counterpart. Given 
the importance of higher education for women’s later-life outcomes in contexts where higher 
education is not widely diffused such as LMICs (Ilie and Rose 2016; Schendel and McCowan 2016) – 
relative to, for instance, the US – we are confident that our estimates are not “too big” to be deemed 
unreliable. If we considered attending higher education as one effective pathway to increase lifetime 
earnings and boost social mobility – shortly, to “get out of poverty” (Kilty 2015; Shimeles 2016) – our 
estimates would actually be quite aligned with those reported by Dahl (2010) in the US, thus 
underscoring the significance of this educational outcome in resource-deprived contexts.  
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Preventing early, coerced, and forced marriage has been on the global agenda for several 
decades, first in 2000 with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) highlighting the reduction of 
child marriage as a global priority, and then in 2015 as part of the global agenda with the establishment 
of the SDGs. We have here argued that SDG Goal 5 – focusing on gender equality to empower all 
women and girls – is linked with progress on the elimination of early marriage, yet it is also inextricably 
linked with SDG Goal 4 (target 4.3), related to better access and more gender-equal participation in 
higher education. Significant progress is nowhere close in either respect, yet a clear implication ensuing 
from this study is that better enforcement and monitoring of legal provisions concerning the minimum 
age at marriage has the potential to raise women’s status by simultaneously enabling the achievement 
of both goals.  
We thus posit two clear implications of this research for policy and speculate on a third point. 
First, the laudable goal of legislation curbing or banning early marriage must be accompanied by 
capacity-building and resourcing for more legal enforcement. Second, monitoring the efficacy of 
deterrence, including through exploiting cheap and plentiful micro-level data as we do here, is essential 
to test and improve the link from laws to ages at marriage, the outcome targeted by policy and the one 
that matters most for women and girls’ later-life outcomes. Third, we speculate on the possibility that 
national marriage policies might have a more meaningful impact if part of a comprehensive, multi-
pronged, and context-sensitive approach targeting poverty and rooted social norms in all their forms. 
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Supplementary Material 
 
Table S.1: Sensitivity analyses with a 4- and a 2-year bandwidth instead of a 3-year bandwidth. 
Results of the OLS models (coefficients), F-statistics for statistically significant associations and 
probit models (marginal effects). Outcome: 1 – first union before age 18 (early union), 0- no first 
union before age 18 (reference category). Independent variable: 1 – treated, 0 – control (reference 
category), all countries  
 
  4-year bandwidth   2-year bandwidth 
  
LPM (Coefs) 
F 
statistic 
Probit (MEs)   LPM (Coefs) 
F 
statistic 
Probit (MEs) 
  Early union   Early union   Early union   Early union 
Tajikistan -0.036** 10.03 -0.036**  -0.051** 9.6 -0.051** 
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Nepal -0.083*** 22.02 -0.082***  -0.083*** 11.14 -0.083*** 
 (0 .018)  (0 .018)  (0 .025)  (0 .025) 
Kazakhstan -0.033** 11.42 -0.033**  -0.027 - -0.027 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Bhutan  -0.046** 9.72  -0.046**   -0.007 - -0.007 
 (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.020)  (0.0202) 
Benin  -0.027 -  -0.027  -0.016 -  -0.0157 
 (0.014)  (0 .014)  (0.0197)  (0.0197) 
Mauritania 0.021 - 0.021  0.019 - 0.019 
  (0.015)   (0.015)   (0.022)   (0.022) 
 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05 
Notes: Coefs: Coefficients; MEs: marginal effects. Control for religion in Nepal and Benin only, as these are the only 
countries where the variable is available. MEs for Nepal and Benin are calculated as average marginal effects. Results 
without controls for religion are essentially unchanged and available upon request.  Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the enumeration area level. P-values for Kazakhstan (2-year window) and 
Benin (4-year window) are p~0.06, hence we report it here as not statistically significant. The main reason is that we 
need a strong instrument to evaluate the impacts on higher-education attendance.  
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Table S.2: Results of two-stage least square models (coefficients), Nepal and Tajikistan 
 
    1st stage 2nd stage 
  Early Union Higher Education 
Tajikistan 
Treated (ref.: control) -0.045**   
 (0.013) 
 
Early union (ref.: no early union)  -1.304** 
 
 (0.491) 
Cons 0.134*** 0.398*** 
 
 (0.011) (0.057) 
Nepal 
Treated (ref.: control) -0.083***   
 (0.020) 
 
Early union (ref.: no early union)  -1.007*** 
 
 
 (0.244) 
 Buddhist (ref.: Muslim) -0.307*** -0.215* 
  (0.067) (0.100) 
 Hindu -0.202*** -0.074 
  (0.053) (0.072) 
 Other -0.270*** -0.164 
  (0.073) (0.099) 
 Cons 0.764*** 0.761*** 
   (0.052) (0.183) 
 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05 
Notes: Ref: reference category. Control for religion included in Nepal (variable not available in Tajikistan). Results 
without control for religion are essentially unchanged and available upon request. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at the enumeration area level.  
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Table S.3: Sensitivity analyses with a 4- and a 2-year bandwidth instead of a 3-year bandwidth. Results of bivariate probit models (marginal 
effects), Nepal and Tajikistan 
 
    4-year bandwidth  2-year bandwidth 
    Bivariate Probit (MEs) Probit (MEs)  Bivariate Probit (MEs) Probit (MEs) 
  Early 
Union 
Higher 
Education 
Higher 
Education 
 Early  
Union 
Higher 
Education 
Higher  
Education 
Tajikistan 
Treated (ref.: control) -0.045***   
 
-0.055***   
 (0.010)   (0.014)   
Early union (ref.: no 
early union)  -0.347*** -0.228***  -0.343*** -0.226*** 
  (0.013) (0.017)  (0 .015) (0.021) 
  biprobit rho=0.987***  biprobit rho=0.988***  
 
    
 
   
Nepal 
Treated (ref.: control) -0.098***   
 
-0.089***   
 (0.014)   (0.023)   
Early union (ref.: no 
early union)  -0.617*** -0.248***  -0.535*** -0.246*** 
  (0.017) (0.016)  (0.096) (0.020) 
  biprobit rho=0.951***  biprobit rho=0.756***  
 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05 
Notes: ME: marginal effects; Ref: reference category. Control for religion included in Nepal (variable not available in Tajikistan). MEs for Nepal are calculated as 
average marginal effects. Results without control for religion are essentially unchanged and available upon request. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered at the enumeration area level. The last column reports marginal effects from a simple probit specification which does not take into account the 
potential endogeneity of early marriage (for reference purposes only). Results from a simple 2SLS model – rather than bivariate probit – are reported in Supplementary 
Materials Table S.4. Results are fully consistent, yet predicted values are outside of plausible boundaries due to shares of women who entered higher education below 
or around 0.20. 
24 
 
Table S.4: Sensitivity analyses with a 4- and a 2-year bandwidth instead of a 3-year bandwidth. 
Results of two-stage least square models (coefficients), Nepal and Tajikistan 
 
 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05 
Notes: Ref: reference category. Control for religion included in Nepal (variable not available in Tajikistan). Results 
without control for religion are essentially unchanged and available upon request. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the enumeration area level.  
 
 
 
    4-year  bandwidth 2-year  bandwidth 
   1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
  Early 
Union 
Higher 
Education 
Early Union 
Higher 
Education 
Tajikistan 
Treated (ref.: control) -0.036**   -0.051**   
 (0.011) 
 (0.016)  
Early union (ref.: no early union)  -1.895**  -1.271* 
 
 (0.665)  (0.503) 
Cons 0.122*** 0.450*** 0.139*** 0.383*** 
 
 (0.010) (0.069) (0.014) (0.059) 
Nepal 
Treated (ref.: control)  -0.083***    -0.083**   
 (-0.018) 
 (0.025)  
Early union (ref.: no early union)  -1.186***  -0.696** 
 
 
 (0.246)  (0.236) 
 Buddhist (ref.: Muslim) -0.287*** -0.250*  -0.276** (-0.111) 
 
 (0.062) (-0.099) (0.086) (0.097) 
 Hindu -0.186*** -0.093 -0.150* 0.016 
 
 (0.051) (0.075) (0.068) (0.064) 
 Other -0.257*** -0.210* -0.276**  -0.093 
 
 (0.069) (0.102) (0.090) (0.098) 
 Cons 0.737*** 0.865*** 0.714*** 0.504** 
    (0.051) (0.178) 0.068 (0.168) 
